Financial and fiscal interaction in the Euro area crisis : this time was different by Caruso, Alberto et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Caruso, Alberto, Reichlin, Lucrezia and Ricco, Giovanni (2018) Financial and fiscal interaction 
in the Euro area crisis : this time was different. Working Paper. Coventry: University of 
Warwick. Department of Economics. Warwick economics research papers series (WERPS) 
(1167) 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/103445 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Warwick Economics Research Papers 
 
 
 
ISSN 2059-4283 (online) 
ISSN 0083-7350 (print)  
 
Financial and Fiscal Interaction in the Euro Area Crisis :  
This Time was Different 
 
 
Alberto Caruso, Lucrezia Reichlin & Giovanni Ricco 
 
 
 
June 2018                    No: 1167 
Financial and Fiscal Interaction in the Euro Area Crisis:
This Time was Diﬀerent
Alberto Caruso∗
Conﬁndustria
Université Libre de Bruxelles
Lucrezia Reichlin†
London Business School
CEPR
Giovanni Ricco‡
University of Warwick
OFCE  Sciences Po
This version: 18 June 2018
Abstract
This paper highlights the anomalous characteristics of the Euro Area `twin crises'
by contrasting the aggregate macroeconomic dynamics in the period 2009-2013 with
the business cycle ﬂuctuations of the previous decades. We report three stylised
facts. First, the contraction in output was marked by an anomalous downfall in
investment, while consumption, savings and unemployment followed their historical
relation with GDP. Second, households' and ﬁnancial corporations' debts, and house
prices deviated from their pre-crisis trends. Third, the jump in the public deﬁcit-
GDP ratio in 2008-2009 was unprecedented and so was the ﬁscal consolidation
that followed. Our analysis points to the ﬁnancial nature of the crisis as a likely
explanation for these facts. Importantly, the `anomaly' in public deﬁcit is in large
part explained by extraordinary measures in support of the ﬁnancial sector, which
show up in the stock-ﬂow adjustments and reveal a key interaction between the
ﬁscal and the ﬁnancial sectors.
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Introduction
This paper analyses the anomalous characteristics in the responses of a rich set of ﬁscal,
ﬁnancial and macroeconomic variables to the macroeconomic shocks that generated the
2008 and 2012 prolonged recessions, as compared to the business cycle regularities of the
previous decades. Our approach is to model the Euro Area as a single economy and the
twin crises  the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and the 2012 sovereign debt crisis  as a potentially
unique event. This to account for the highly integrated economic and ﬁnancial features
of the Euro Area, and for the possibly common chain of events linking the two recessions.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on the special nature of ﬁnancial crises
as opposed to regular recessions. Much of the existing empirical literature in this area
has investigated the path of a handful of macroeconomic variables by using a single
regression approach, in which ﬁnancial crises are identiﬁed by using a narrative dummy
or a quantitative index (e.g., among others, Reinhart et al., 2012, Jordà et al., 2013b,
and Romer and Romer, 2017). A stylised fact emerging from this strand of research
is that recessions that are associated to ﬁnancial crises tend to be deeper, longer, and
characterised by prolonged cycles of deleveraging which weigh on the economy.
Diﬀerently from this approach, we focus on the fallout of a single ﬁnancial crisis
but provide a landscape view over the economy by adopting a rich multivariate Vector
Autoregression (VAR) model with real, nominal and ﬁnancial variables to capture the
interdependence of business and ﬁnancial cycles.1 Our Euro Area-wide VARmodel makes
use of historical quarterly time series data from 1983 to 2013 to jointly model the dynamic
interaction of (i) macro aggregates  real GDP, consumption, investment, unemployment;
(ii) inﬂation, long- and short-term interest rates; (iii) several ﬁscal indicators  spending,
taxes, transfers and interest payments; (iv) diﬀerent spreads; (v) credit aggregates; (vi)
house prices.2 Including in our model a rich set of ﬁscal aggregates and rates capturing
1We adopt a Large Vector Autoregression (VAR) model with Bayesian priors that can incorporates
a rich set of variables capturing monetary, ﬁscal, ﬁnancial and real economic conditions, by eﬃciently
coping with the dimensionality problem (De Mol et al., 2008; Ba«bura et al., 2010). In our empirical
speciﬁcation, we adopt two sets of standard macroeconomic priors: Minnesota priors (Litterman, 1980,
1986) and sum-of-coeﬃcients priors (Doan et al., 1984). The strength of these priors is optimally set
using the hierarchical approach proposed by Giannone et al. (2015).
2The ﬁscal variables come from an updated version of a unique quarterly database for the Euro
Area, described in Paredes et al. (2009).
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the monetary policy stance is potentially of great importance in examining the policy
mix historically adopted in the Euro Area before and after the crisis. In fact, as ﬁrstly
shown by Leeper (1991), it is important to model the joint behaviour of the monetary and
ﬁscal authorities in explaining macroeconomic outcomes (see Leeper and Leith, 2016, for
a review of the extensive research on the issue). Moreover, expanding the econometric
information to incorporate both ﬂow and stock variables such as household, ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial corporation leverage helps identify the potential role of balance sheet
adjustments. Similarly to us, Brunnermeier et al. (2017) propose a multivariate VAR
approach to distinguish the several channels of interaction between ﬁnancial variables
and the macroeconomy and to control for the response of policy variables.
In joint modelling the evolution of ﬁnancial and macro variables and the underly-
ing cycles, we have to deal with a number of issues. First, trends and low frequency
components are diﬃcult to capture empirically, due to the inherent low number of ob-
servations. More speciﬁcally, the limited lag order of VAR models may fail to correctly
capture the ﬁnancial cycles, that are thought to have much lower frequency than (and
associate weakly with) the traditional business cycle (see, e.g. Borio, 2014). We try
to address these issues by enriching our econometric information set and by adopting
macroeconomic priors providing credibility to the idea of independent stochastic trend
components. Also, we explicitly analyse and assess the plausibility the implicit trends
retrieved by our model. Second, VAR-based estimates allow to take into account general
equilibrium eﬀects but do not accommodate for non-linearities, which are implicit, for
example, in the debt accumulation equation (see, for example, Favero and Giavazzi, 2007
for a discussion on this point). To handle this issue we follow Favero and Giavazzi (2007)
and adopt a VARX framework, where public debt can aﬀect all variables but its dynam-
ics is reconstructed externally as a cumulated sum of the deﬁcit implied by the evolution
of ﬁscal aggregates inside the model. This approach, beyond providing robustness to
our analysis, also allows to highlight how the measure of public debt resulting from the
cumulative sum of public deﬁcit can diﬀer from the actual public debt, due to stock-ﬂow
adjustments. In fact, the latter can be large in periods of ﬁnancial distress given the size
of ﬁnancial transfers which are accounted for as debt but did not originate from ﬁscal
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deﬁcits (for a discussion of the signiﬁcance of this measure, see Alt and Lassen, 2006).
Our model provides three sets of empirical results. First, we perform a model-based
counterfactual exercise by estimating the model for the period 1983-2007 (pre-crisis
sample) and computing forecasts for 2008-2013, based on the pre-crisis parameters and
conditional on the realised (observed) paths of nominal GDP and inﬂation. In comput-
ing conditional forecasts, we adopt the methodology proposed in Giannone et al. (2010)
and detailed in Ba«bura et al. (2015). This exercise can be interpreted as a test for
the statement `this time is diﬀerent'. In fact, conditional on the prolonged drop in out-
put triggered by the 2008 crisis (and the related path of inﬂation), it allows to uncover
the diﬀerences between the conditional and the realised paths of the other variables
examined and highlights potential anomalous responses as compared to the historical
pattern observed in recessions.3
Second, using results from the ﬁrst exercise, we then study how two measures of
public debt  the cumulative sum of the deﬁcit and the observed debt incorporating
stock-ﬂow adjustments  deviated from its predicted measure conditional on the collapse
in output. If the observed path of any variable is found to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from what observed in its `stressed' scenario, we conclude that there is a departure from
previous cyclical experiences.
Third, we study how the realised paths of the variables of interest deviated from the
unconditional forecast and the implicit trends recovered by the model. This exercise
provides a gauge on how much (or how little) correlation exists in the data between
macro and ﬁnancial variables. It also provides useful information on pre-crisis trends.
Our approach does not recover the nature of the shocks that caused the deep reces-
sions, nor allows to infer causal relationships among the variables. Indeed, while our
ﬁndings provide new evidence on what happens after ﬁnancial crises, they only convey
suggestive evidence of any causal impact of ﬁnancial distress onto the economy. Also,
importantly, the approach does not disentangle the complex causal relation between the
3A similar approach has been used in recent works by Giannone et al. (2014) and Colangelo et al.
(2017) in studying the response of monetary policy to the crisis.
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exceptional ﬁscal and monetary policies undertaken and the macroeconomic perform-
ances observed. This limitation is common to the rest of the literature that has studied
ﬁnancial crises by adopting a treatment variable (and not exogenous events) deﬁned in
terms of anomalous credit conditions with respect to an historical norm.4
Our results conﬁrm ﬁndings reported by extant literature while expanding on the set
of stylised facts. First, the contraction in output was marked by an anomalous deep and
persistent downfall in investment, beyond historical regularities; conversely, consump-
tion, savings and unemployment followed their historical relation with GDP. Second,
house prices contracted, and households' and ﬁnancial corporations' debt adjusted more
than in previous business cycle recessions, while deviating from their pre-crisis trends;
non-ﬁnancial corporations debt instead followed historical regularities. Third, results
indicate that households', ﬁnancial corporations' debts and house prices are weakly as-
sociated to the economic cycle in the pre-crisis sample, possibly due to two decades
of leveraging. In the post-crisis sample, they markedly deviated from their pre-crisis
trends, as a consequence of the deleveraging. Finally, the jump in the ﬁscal deﬁcit-GDP
ratio in 2008-2009 was unprecedented and so was the ﬁscal consolidation that followed.
Importantly, the `anomaly' in public deﬁcit is in large part explained by extraordinary
measures in support of the ﬁnancial sector, which show up in the stock-ﬂow adjustments
and reveals a key interaction between the ﬁscal and the ﬁnancial sectors. Our analysis
points to the ﬁnancial nature of the crisis as a likely explanation for these facts.
Related Literature. This paper is related to the recent literature investigating the
behaviour of the economy in the aftermath of deep recessions and ﬁnancial crises. A
narrative approach in dating crises is commonly used in the literature, as for example
in the inﬂuential book of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a) and in a series of articles (e.g.
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2009b, 2014). This approach has been pioneered by Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996), and then extended by a number of important works, as for example
Bordo et al. (2001), Cerra and Saxena (2008), Claessens et al. (2009, 2010), Gourinchas
4It is important to stress that, given our approach, we cannot discriminate amongst competing
explanations. In particular we cannot determine whether the uncovered anomalous features were due
to the `depth' of the drop in output (and hence the activation of non-linearities and hysteresis eﬀects),
to the ﬁnancial nature of the crisis, or to a sudden permanent change in the underlying trends.
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and Obstfeld (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jordà et al. (2013b), Laeven and
Valencia (2014), and Bordo and Haubrich (2017). Most of these studies adopt a single
regression approach to investigate the path of a handful of macroeconomic variables
following a crisis, identiﬁed by using a narrative dummy or a quantitative index. A
common ﬁnding in this literature is that recessions accompanied by ﬁnancial crises tend
to be more severe, while recoveries are particularly slow compared to deep recessions.
Hoggarth et al. (2002), and Laeven and Valencia (2013) compare the path of output
following crises with projections of pre-crisis trends. These studies ﬁnd that output
often falls far below the pre-crisis path, but that there is substantial dispersion across
episodes.
Slightly diﬀerent results are reported by Bordo and Haubrich (2017), who ﬁnd that
the slow recovery pattern in the US is true only in the 1930s, the early 1990s and after the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Romer and Romer (2017) reﬁne the narrative approach employing
OECD accounts of ﬁnancial crises to classify ﬁnancial distress on a relatively ﬁne scale.
They ﬁnd that the average decline in output following a ﬁnancial crisis is statistically
signiﬁcant and persistent, but only moderate in size, with eﬀects that are highly variable
across major episodes.
In focussing on a rich set of ﬁscal variables we also connect to the literature which
studies the impact of prolonged periods of exceptionally high public debt onto economic
growth. Reinhart et al. (2012), basing their analysis on a cross-section of countries, have
suggested that high public debt overhang has a negative eﬀect on growth. Jordá et al.
(2013a), focussing on a cross-section of recessions for diﬀerent countries, show that this
negative eﬀect is only at work when recessions are associated to ﬁnancial crises. Further-
more, by incorporating some measure of interest rates spread we relate to Krishnamurthy
and Muir (2017), who investigate credit spreads as a possible indicator of ﬁnancial dis-
turbances, and ﬁnds a substantial correlation between this statistical measure of ﬁnancial
distress and common crisis chronologies.
Finally, this paper may provide relevant insights to the debate about the post crisis
slump in the Euro Area and the ongoing discussion on the reform of the economic
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governance of the European Monetary Union (EMU).5 The policy debate has emphasised,
for example, that the ﬁscal framework of the Euro Area induces pro-cyclicality of ﬁscal
policy in response to large macro-shocks. When monetary policy is constrained at the
zero-lower bound this implies an inadequate policy mix and depresses aggregate demand
excessively (see for example Corsetti et al., 2016).
1 Fiscal and ﬁnancial facts
In this section we report some background facts providing suggestive evidence on the
ﬁnancial nature of the crisis. First, we document the anomalous pattern of term and
sovereign spreads in the Euro Area, and show that they suggest the activation of diﬀerent
types of ﬁnancial stress at diﬀerent points of the crisis. Second, we provide evidence of
the fact that the anomalous accumulation of public debt during the last crisis in the
Euro Area as a whole is related to the crisis in the ﬁnancial sector of the core countries
of the area. While this observation cannot fully determine the ﬁscal or ﬁnancial nature
of the crisis, it provides some interesting facts about the sources of deterioration of the
ﬁscal position of the Euro Area.
Let us ﬁrst turn to some potential indicators of ﬁnancial frictions. We select two
variables as proxies: the spread between the ten-year interest rate on government bonds
and the three month Euribor (term spread) and the spread between the ten year interest
rates on Italian debt and German debt (sovereign spread). We use the sovereign spread
as an indicator of risk associated with the risk of disintegration of the EMU, the so-
called `redenomination' risk. To this aim we consider Italy rather than a country that
lost access to the market during the crisis like Greece, Portugal or Ireland. Figure 5
plots these variables.
The left-hand chart includes the entire sample and is dominated by the decline of the
sovereign spread in preparation of the euro, while it does not show a cyclical behaviour.
Conversely, the term spread has a typical anti-cyclical dynamics, raising in recessions
and then normalising with a lag. The chart on the right is a zoom of the recent years,
5The European Economic Review has devoted a special issue to the debate on the persistent post-
crisis slump and on the resulting ﬁscal and monetary policy challenges (see EER, 2016).
7
Term Spread and ITA-GER Spread
85Q1 90Q1 95Q1 00Q1 05Q1 10Q1
Years
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
%
 S
pr
ea
d
Spread 10years-3months
ITA-GER Long Term Interest Rate Spread
Last Crisis
10Q1
Years
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Figure 1: Italy-Germany long term sovereign interest rates spread and term spread
deﬁned as 10 years - 3 months.
with shaded areas indicating CEPR dated recessions. A simple message is apparent:
the dominant friction in the 2008-09 recession was the steepening of the term spread
aﬀecting all countries, while in the second was the cross-country spread revealing peri-
phery countries stress. In other words, the Euro Area economy in the period 2008-2013
was subject to two diﬀerent sources of risks: term risk and sovereign risk. The former
characterises the ﬁrst recession, the latter, the second.
Let us now report some key facts about ﬁscal deﬁcit of the Euro Area as a whole.
Figure 2 focuses on the three recessions in our sample with starting dates in 1980, 1991,
and 2008. In the left panel it reports public debt to GDP ratios and in the right one the
deﬁcit to GDP ratio. For each episode the debt and deﬁcit variables are set equal to 100
at the beginning of the recession. The horizontal axis indicates quarters after that date.
Following each recession, the deﬁcit to GDP ratio increases due to the decline of
GDP (the denominator), the decline in tax income and the eﬀect of ﬁscal stabilisers on
public expenditure. The 2008 recession, however, is of a diﬀerent order of magnitude:
due to the dramatic decline of GDP, the deﬁcit to GDP ratio spikes up and continues to
do so until early 2009, when a massive ﬁscal consolidation takes place. The latter, also
unprecedented, implied a halving of the deﬁcit in about four years, but failed to stabilise
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Figure 2: Euro Area government debt/GDP and deﬁcit/GDP. Indices based at 100 in
the quarters in which each recession starts.
public debt which continued to increase albeit at a declining rate.
The question of whether ﬁscal consolidation was excessive, thereby contributing to
slow down the recovery due to a large multiplier in a context of distressed ﬁnancial
markets, or whether it was not aggressive enough, has generated a large debate.6 Less
attention has been devoted to the anomalous debt-deﬁcit dynamics related to the inter-
action between ﬁnancial distress and public expenditure. To appreciate this point it is
interesting to look at the historical relation between public debt and the rate of change
(quarterly diﬀerences) of public deﬁcit. The relation between debt and deﬁcit can be
expressed as:
Dt −Dt−1 = pdt + adjt, (1)
where D is the stock of the public sector gross debt and pd is the public deﬁcit. The
residual, the so-called stock-ﬂow adjustment, is explained by valuation eﬀects, ﬁnancial
transactions which are not reﬂected in the deﬁcit, and errors and omissions.
Typically the residual is small, but occasionally it can be big. The literature has
documented that creative accounting can inﬂate the residual near election time or when
the economy enters a slump (Reischmann, 2016). In Europe, there is also evidence of a
6Our analysis is silent on this important question.
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Figure 3: Euro Area government deﬁcit and ﬁrst diﬀerences of government debt.
persistent positive residual in the nineties when EU rules kicked in (see Alt et al., 2014
for evidence on this point). However, data from 2010 and 2012 are striking and point to
very special circumstances. Figure 3 describes the ﬁrst diﬀerence in public debt and the
public deﬁcit. Typically the two series are very similar, indicating a small residual. In
the nineties the residual was positive, conﬁrming results of the earlier literature but, in
2009 and 2011, there are two large peaks in the debt series which are unprecedented.
Eurostat data for the period 2008-2011 in Table 2 shows that these peaks are almost
entirely explained by ﬁnancial transactions which did not originate from the deﬁcit but
are accounted for in the public debt. These are related to special measures adopted in
the crisis to support the ﬁnancial sector, mainly acquisition of ﬁnancial assets by the
government (see Appendix B for further details). Several countries in the Euro Area had
stock-ﬂow adjustments which exceeded 2% of GDP. The large positive ﬁgure in Germany
in 2008 reﬂects the purchases of securities by two special purpose vehicles in the context
of operations related to the ﬁnancial crisis, while in 2010 it reﬂects the transfer of assets
of two public defeasance structures classiﬁed in the government sector. The 2009 ﬁgure
for Ireland reﬂects capital injection in the form of preference shares. Similar measures
are in evidence for other countries (see Eurostat, 2012 for details). Aggregate ﬁgures are
heavily inﬂuenced by Germany, which is the largest country in the Union and also the
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Table 1: Stock Flow Adjustments, 2008-2011, as % of GDP
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average Sum Sum (% of 2011 EA GDP)
Euro Area 3.2 0.8 1.5 0.6 1.6 6.2 6.2
BE 6.7 -0.5 0.2 2.1 2.1 8.5 0.3
DE 2.7 1.8 7.5 0.3 3.1 12.3 3.2
IE 10.7 1.6 -5.6 2.4 2.3 9.1 0.2
ES 0.5 1.0 -2.1 -0.8 -0.3 -1.4 -0.2
FI 4.3 4.5 4.2 2.5 3.9 15.5 0.3
FR 2.2 1.7 -1.8 0.9 0.8 3 0.6
IT 1.5 1 0.8 -0.4 0.7 2.9 0.5
NL 15.4 -5.5 -1.1 -0.8 2 8 0.5
PT 0.7 -0.1 2.5 9.2 3.1 12.3 0.2
Table 2: Stock-ﬂow adjustments in 2008-2011. Percent of GDP. Source: Eurostat (2012).
country that showed the largest debt increase due to extraordinary ﬁnancial expenses as
well as the most drastic ﬁscal consolidation.
Clearly the increase in debt due to these measures represents a cost in terms of future
taxes. Since the Stability and Growth Pact rules are set for public debt as well as public
deﬁcit, the very large ﬁscal consolidation since 2009 is likely to have been motivated by
the increase in debt caused by these special measures.
Turning now on the analysis of the deﬁcit, Figure 4 shows the dynamics of government
expenditures and revenues. While public debt was increasing due to measures in support
of the ﬁnancial sector, ﬁscal consolidation since 2010 was taking place mostly by a
ﬂattening of government expenditures. Figure 5 reports the growth of diﬀerent public
expenditures items as percentage of the rate of growth of total expenditures. It shows
that the decline in the growth rate of government expenditures is associated to a decline
in the contribution of social payments, government consumption and public investment.
Notice also two spikes in the contribution of what is deﬁned as a residual, which is
explained by ad hoc capital transfers (that appear directly in the deﬁcit) related to
support of the ﬁnancial sector.
Let us summarise the descriptive features we have illustrated.
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Figure 5: Contributions to the year on year growth rate of Euro Area government
expenditures.
1. In 2008, in relation to the collapse of GDP, both the public debt-GDP and public
deﬁcit-GDP ratios experienced a sudden deterioration which is much larger than
anything experienced in the recessions included in our sample.
2. The dynamics of public debt is partly explained by measures in support of the
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ﬁnancial system that were not accounted for as deﬁcit.
3. Since 2009, we have seen a major ﬁscal adjustment with the deﬁcit-GDP ratio
declining more than in any other expansions.
4. The ﬁscal adjustment was mostly achieved by a ﬂattening of government expendit-
ures.
5. The latter was achieved by a decrease in the contribution of social payments,
government consumption and public investment in favour of an increase to expenses
in favour of the ﬁnancial sector (capital transfers).
In the next sections we analyse these facts through the lens of an econometric model.
2 A Macro-Finance VAR for the Euro Area
In order to capture the complex interactions shaping the aggregate Euro Area economy
we adopt a large VAR including a rich set of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial indicators. In
particular we consider 20 time series for the Euro Area aggregate, including ﬁscal and
monetary policy variables, real output and its components, unemployment, prices, assets
and several credit and ﬁnancial variables for the sample 1981Q1-2008Q1. Importantly, we
incorporate both standard macroeconomic ﬂow variables and detailed ﬁscal indicators,
but also stocks such as debt in diﬀerent sectors. Table 3 lists the variables used in the
model. Variables enter the model in log-levels, except for variables expressed in rates or
with negative levels. When in levels (or log-levels), they are deﬂated by using the GDP
deﬂator. This choice has the advantage of avoiding problems related to arbitrary choices
of data transformations which can distort results.7
In incorporating this rich dataset in our VAR we have to deal with four major chal-
lenges. First, while VARs are usually speciﬁed for ﬂow variables and rates  e.g. output
and its components or policy rates , we need to model the joint evolution of stock
and ﬂow variables. In doing this the potentially non-linear relationship between stocks
7The ﬁscal variables come from an updated version of a unique quarterly database for the Euro Area,
described in (Paredes et al., 2009). A more detailed description including sources and data treatment is
provided in Appendix A.
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and ﬂows may distort VAR estimates. This is of particular concern, for example, for
the deﬁcit and the debt accumulation equation. Second, a model capturing the joint
dynamics of many macro and ﬁnancial variables has necessarily a large cross-sectional
dimension and an expansive set of parameters to be estimated with non-standard tech-
niques. Third, VARs tend to extract `implicit' deterministic components (trends) from
the initial conditions of the data, that are taken as given. In doing so they may overﬁt
the data, and explain too much of their variation by these deterministic components.
Finally, in our VAR this problems are compounded by the empirical issue that ﬁnancial
stock variables  often thought of as driven by long cycles  tend to have low correlation
with real variables at business cycle frequency, and may not be well captured by a VAR
with limited lags.
To deal with the possible non-linear equation of debt accumulation, we adopt an
approach similar to the one suggested by Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and consider a
VARX, that is a VAR with public debt treated as an exogenous variable. Diﬀerently
from Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we introduce ﬁscal budget components independently
in the VAR and reconstruct the public debt as the cumulative sum of the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
The variables listed in Table 3, with the exception of the public debt and the public
deﬁcit, are collected in a vector of endogenous variables Yt, while we specify separate
equations for Dt  the stock of the Euro Area consolidated public debt (without the
stock-ﬂow adjustment) , and for the public deﬁcit pdt. Our VARX model has the form:
Yt = c+A(L)Yt−1 + b(L)Dt + ut (2)
Dt = D0 +
t∑
j=0
pdj (3)
pdt = Gt + TRt + IP t − Tt (4)
where ut is a normally distributed multivariate white noise with covariance matrix Σ
and A(L) is a matrix polynomial of order p = 4 in the lag operator L. The ﬁscal deﬁcit,
pdt, is constructed as the sum of the relevant ﬁscal variables  i.e. public expenditure
G, ﬁscal transfers TR, interest payments IP , and tax receipts T  that are individually
present in the vector of endogenous variables Yt. In this form the debt accumulation
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Variable Description Source
GDP Real GDP Euro Area Wide Model
Consumption Personal consumption Euro Area Wide Model
Investment Gross investment Euro Area Wide Model
Unemployment Unemployment rate Euro Area Wide Model
Gov Deﬁcit General government deﬁcit Euro Area Fiscal Database
Gov Debt General government debt Euro Area Fiscal Database
Gov Spending General government total
expenditure
Euro Area Fiscal Database
Gov Revenues General government total
revenue
Euro Area Fiscal Database
Social Payments General government social
payments
Euro Area Fiscal Database
HH Savings Household saving rate Euro Area Wide Model
HH Debt Households debt Authors' Calculations
NFC Debt Non-ﬁnancial corporations
debt
Authors' Calculations
FC Debt Debt securities of MFI
excl. ESCB
Authors' Calculations
CA/GDP Current account / GDP Euro Area Wide Model
House Prices House prices ECB
Long Term IR Long term interest rate Euro Area Wide Model
Short Term IR Short term interest rate Euro Area Wide Model
HCPI Harmonized consumer
price index
Euro Area Wide Model
ITA-GER i.r. spread Spread Italian-German 10-
year bond yields
Eurostat
Table 3: List of Variables. See Appendix A for the details.
equation is a linear function of its components.
We deal with the challenge of incorporating in an eﬃcient manner a large set of
variables by adopting Bayesian VAR techniques, that oﬀer a convenient way to deal
with large datasets. In fact, BVARs can eﬃciently deal with the problem of over-
parametrisation through the use of prior information about the model coeﬃcients. The
key idea is to use informative priors that shrink the unrestricted model towards a parsimo-
nious stylised benchmark model, thereby  in frequentist language  reducing parameter
uncertainty, while introducing minimal bias.
More speciﬁcally, our BVAR is estimated adopting two sets of standard macroeco-
nomic priors: Minnesota priors (Litterman, 1980, 1986) and sum-of-coeﬃcients priors
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(Doan et al., 1984). While these priors are not motivated by economic theory, they cap-
ture commonly held beliefs about how economic time series behave. In fact, Minnesota
and sum-of-coeﬃcients are widely applied standard priors in macroeconometric research,
that are proven to improve forecasting performances of VAR models.
Minnesota priors can be casted in the form of Normal-Inverse Wishart (NIW) conjug-
ate priors, that assume a multivariate normal distribution for the regression coeﬃcients
and an Inverse Wishart speciﬁcation for the covariance matrix of the error term Σ. Con-
ditional on a draw for Σ, the Minnesota prior assumes the coeﬃcients A1, . . . , Ap to be
a priori independent and normally distributed, with the following moments
E [(A`)ij |Σ] =

δi i = j, ` = 1
0 otherwise
Var [(A`)ij |Σ] =

λ
` for i = j,∀`
λ
`
Σij
σ2j
for i 6= j,∀`.
(5)
In Eq. (5), (A`)ij denotes the coeﬃcient of variable j in equation i at lag `. δi is
either 0 or 1  for stationary series, or variables that have been transformed to achieve
stationarity, we centre the distribution around zero. The factor Σij/σ2j accounts for the
diﬀerent scales of variables i and j. The hyperparameters σi are ﬁxed using sample
information, as the standard deviations of the residuals of univariate regressions of each
variable onto its own lags. Importantly, λ is a hyperparameter that controls the overall
tightness of the random walk prior. If λ = 0 the prior information dominates, and the
VAR reduces to a vector of univariate models. Conversely, as λ→∞ the prior becomes
less informative, and the posterior mostly mirrors sample information. Minnesota priors
can be implemented using dummy observations. Priors on A coeﬃcients are implemented
by the following pseudo-observations
y
(1)
d =
 diag([δ1σ1, . . . , δnσn])/λ
0n(p−1)×n
 , (6)
x
(1)
d =
[
Jp ⊗ diag([σ1, . . . , σn])/λ 0np×1
]
. (7)
A second set of priors, the sum-of-coeﬃcients (or `no-cointegration') priors (Doan
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et al., 1984), can be relevant in dealing with the challenge of the relatively weak joint
dynamics connecting private debt and real variables, while reducing concerns about the
overﬁtting of VARs estimated conditional on initial observations. In fact, these priors
provide more weight to the hypothesis that macro and ﬁnancial variables can be approx-
imated by independent random walks with drifts.8 This stylised description is helpful in
modelling the joint dynamics of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables, combining stock
and ﬂow indicators, and possibly exhibiting heterogenous trend components.
Speciﬁcally, the sum-of-coeﬃcients prior captures the belief that when the average
lagged values of a variable yi,t is at some level yi, that same value yi is likely to be a good
forecast of yi,t. It also implies that knowing the average of lagged values of variable j
does not help in predicting a variable i 6= j. This prior is implemented using n artiﬁcial
observations, one for each variable in yt
y
(2)
d
[n×n]
= diag
([
y¯0,1
τ
, . . . ,
y¯0,n
τ
])
, x
(2)
d
[n×(np+1)]
= [y
(2)
d , . . . , y
(2)
d , 0], (8)
where y¯0,i, i = 1, . . . , n are the average of the ﬁrst four initial values of each variable.
The prior implied by these dummy observations is centred at 1 for the sum of coeﬃcients
on own lags for each variable, and at 0 for the sum of coeﬃcients on other variables' lags.
It also introduces correlation among the coeﬃcients of each variable in each equation.
In fact, it is easy to show that equation by equation this prior implies the stochastic
constraint
(1− (A1)jj − . . .− (Ap)jj) y¯0,j = τudt ∀j , (9)
where (A`)jj denotes the coeﬃcient of variable j in equation j at lag `. The hyper-
parameter τ controls the variance of these prior beliefs. As τ → ∞ the prior becomes
uninformative, while for τ → 0 the model implies that each variable is an independent
unit-root process and there is no cointegration relationship.
In order to assign less probability to versions of the model in which deterministic
transient components are more important than the stochastic component in explaining
8While results for a BVARs with only Minnesota priors are qualitatively unchanged, sum-of-
coeﬃcients priors are helpful in reducing estimation uncertainty on the long end of the conditional
forecast.
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the series variance, we combine sum-of-coeﬃcients dummy observations with dummy
observations that favour the VAR intercept to be equal to zero (c = 0), as suggested
by Sims and Zha (1998). A fairly loose prior for the intercept of this type can be
implemented with the following dummy observations:
y
(3)
d =
[
01×n
]
,
x
(3)
d =
[
01×np 
]
,
where  is an hyperparameter set to a very small number.9
The setting of the priors depends importantly on the hyperparameters λ and τ ,
which reﬂect the informativeness of the prior distributions for the model coeﬃcients.
In setting the value of these hyperparameters, regulating the strength of prior beliefs,
we follow the approach proposed by Giannone et al. (2015). This involves treating the
hyperparameters as additional parameters, in the spirit of hierarchical modelling.
Conditional forecasts are obtained from a Bayesian Vector Autoregression estimated
on the pre-crisis sample, by employing the Kalman ﬁltering techniques used ﬁrst in Gi-
annone et al. (2010) and detailed in Ba«bura et al. (2015). The procedure exploits the
fact that Vector Autoregressive models can be cast in a state-space form. Hence, the
conditional forecasts can be computed using Kalman ﬁltering techniques and the coun-
terfactual simulations can be drawn using the simulation smoother of Carter and Kohn
(1994). As discussed in Ba«bura et al. (2015), since the Kalman ﬁlter works recursively,
this algorithm reduces the computational burden signiﬁcantly for longer forecast hori-
zons, and is particularly well suited for empirical approaches where large data sets are
being handled.
3 This Time was Diﬀerent
In this section we present three sets of empirical results: (i) we compare the actual path
of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables with their model-based forecast conditional on
9We set  the have a fairly loose prior variance equal to 106.
18
the pre-crisis sample and the realised path for output and inﬂation during the crisis; (ii)
we zoom into the conditional predicted outcome for public debt and deﬁcit and assess
the role of stock-ﬂow adjustment and measures of support to ﬁnancial institutions; (iii)
we compare conditional and unconditional forecasts and make inference about pre- and
post-crisis trends.
3.1 How if the 2008 crisis had been just a `normal' recession?
The question we want to ask is whether the observed behaviour of the variables since 2008
could have been expected given their historical correlation with the macroeconomy and
the observed path of GDP and inﬂation. To provide an answer to this question, we com-
pute model-based expectations for all macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables, conditional
on the actual path of output and prices in 2008Q22013Q4, and using parameters es-
timated on the sample 1981Q12008Q1.10 A signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the observed
path and the median of the simulated path (conditional expectation) would suggest that
the exceptional decline of GDP alone cannot explain what we have observed, given the
realised inﬂation and the historical pattern of business cycle recessions.
Figure 6 reports the realised paths of all the variables included in the model, the
median of the conditional forecasts as well as 68% (darker blue) and 90% (lighter blue)
coverage intervals to provide a measure of uncertainty. A number of features are appar-
ent.
First, while consumption, savings and unemployment followed their historical relation
with GDP, the contraction in output was marked by an anomalous protracted downfall
in investment. In fact, while the high persistence of unemployment in Europe is in line
with past regularities (albeit in the upper tail of the forecast outcomes),11 the `hysteresis'
10To obtain conditional forecasts we ﬁrst estimate the VAR model parameters' posterior distribu-
tions for the period 1981Q12008Q1. Then, we compute for all variables the conditional expectations
for 2008Q22013Q4. For any given draw of the model's parameters from their posterior density, the
draws from the counterfactual exercise are computed as conditional forecasts in which the condition-
ing information is given by: (1) the pre-crisis history of all variables in the model; (2) their estimated
parameters capturing historical correlations; (3) the observed paths of GDP and inﬂation for 2008Q2
2013Q4. We report the median as well as 68% and 90% coverage intervals.
11Blanchard and Summers (1986) and more recently Galí (2015) observed that `hysteresis' in labour
market (i.e. high persistence of unemployment) in Europe may be due to the nature of its wage setting
mechanisms and their impact on the sensitivity of wages to unemployment.
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Figure 6: Conditional forecast. The ﬁgure shows the realised data (red) and the counterfactual
path of the variables. The blue lines are the medians of the forecasts conditional on the path of
GDP, plotted with 68% (dark blue) and 90% (light blue) coverage intervals. House Prices and
HICP are indices, interest rates and spreads are expressed in yearly rates, HH Savings is the
Eurostat saving ratio; all the other variables are in Millions of Euros in real terms, with 1995 as
reference year.
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pattern in investment (see Dixit, 1992)  to which the model assigns probability close to
zero  is markedly anomalous.
Second, also ﬁscal aggregates show an anomalous behaviour. It is useful, however,
to distinguish between the ﬁrst recession, in the period 2008Q1-2009Q3, from the sub-
sequent adjustment. The ﬁrst recession was characterised by an unusual decline in gov-
ernment revenues, which fell below the distribution of the forecast paths conditional on
the large observed decline of GDP; and by an increase in government expenditures and
social payments in the upper tail of the predicted outcomes. The fact that tax revenues
declined more than what could have been expected given the behaviour of output and
prices could suggest the activations of non-linearities due to the progressive nature of the
tax system. However, the adjustment since late 2009 produced a sudden `normalisation'
for tax revenues, government expenditures and social payments.
Third, during the ﬁrst recession there was an anomalously large current account
deﬁcit, possibly explained by the collapse of world trade which, in 2008, was larger than
the one of GDP. The adjustment since late 2009 involved a sharp reversal, with the
current account returning to the historical counterfactual path and then overshooting to
an unusually large surplus. This may also relate to the unusual decline in investment
and sharp ﬁscal adjustment experienced by the Euro Area.
Fourth, while household savings were quite stable, households' and ﬁnancial corpor-
ations' debts and house prices deviated from the predicted paths. This shows a strong
deleveraging of the European economy after the crisis. Also, the long-term interest rate
stayed for the ﬁrst part of the crisis at an unusually high level, possibly calling into
action the unconventional monetary policy measures enacted by the ECB in the rest of
the sample.
Finally, other features of the results deserve some comments. In correspondence to
the debt crisis of 2011, we have an unusual steep increase in the Italian-German spread
debt which persist till the end of the forecast period. Conversely, the interest rate term
spread 10 year - 3 months on government bonds moves steeply to the upper tail of the
distribution of the forecast during the 2008-2009 recession. Indeed results quantify the
observations of Section 1 by showing that while an unusually high term spread was a
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Figure 7: Conditional forecast public debt and public deﬁcit ratios. The ﬁgure shows
the realised data (red), the data minus stock-ﬂow adjustment (green) and the counterfactual
path (blue). The blue lines are the medians of the forecasts conditional on the path of GDP and
inﬂation, plotted with 68% (dark blue) and 90% (light blue) coverage intervals.
feature of the ﬁrst recession, an unusually high core-periphery sovereign spread was a
feature of the second. In other words, the model correctly identiﬁes diﬀerent ﬁnancial
frictions in the two recessions.
3.2 The debt-deﬁcit dynamics
Let us now turn to the public debt and ﬁscal deﬁcit. As described earlier, we construct
the deﬁcit from the disaggregated data on revenues and expenditures while we construct
public debt as the sum of the deﬁcit. Figure 7 shows the observed and counterfactual
paths for the two variables expressed as ratios with respect to GDP. In addition, we
report data on public debt without stock-ﬂow adjustments.
The left panel, showing actual and counterfactual paths for the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio,
reﬂects the features noticed on Figure 6. A sharp ﬁscal consolidation from 2009Q3,
started more than a year earlier than what predicted by the counterfactual path, brought
down the large gap in 2008-2009 between the counterfactual path of the deﬁcit ratio and
the actual ratio. By 2010, the realised deﬁcit is back inside the predicted conditional
distribution of forecasts. This quantiﬁes in statistical term what observed in the previous
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Figure 8: Scatter plot: Debt and deﬁcit counterfactual.
section by comparing data across recessions: the ﬁscal consolidation of 2009-2010 was
sudden and of an unprecedented size.
The right panel shows the dynamics of public debt. It reports both the actual level
of debt-to-GDP ratio (red line) and the non-stock-ﬂow adjusted ratio (green line). The
adjusted debt ratio, that includes measure of support to the ﬁnancial sector, jumps up
immediately above the counterfactual and stays about 15% higher than the non-adjusted
line until 2012, when it jumps up again as the eﬀect of an other wave of special measures
in support of the ﬁnancial sector (see Table 2 in Section 1). The non-adjusted path,
which we compute as the sum of the deﬁcit, is at the end of the sample just outside
the upper limit of the 90% predicted distribution. The big anomaly of the stock-ﬂow
adjusted debt dynamics seems therefore largely explained by the special measures in
support of the ﬁnancial sector.
To gain further insight about the joint path of public debt and deﬁcit, let us consider
the observed and counterfactual scatter-plot illustrated in Figure 8. Let us keep in mind
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that the latter is computed taking into account all general equilibrium relationships
implicit in the VAR model. The ﬁgure shows that the relationship between deﬁcit and
debt is highly non-linear and that, during the ﬁscal contraction, the increase in debt
associated with a given decline in deﬁcit has been larger than expected. The yellow dots,
representing the deﬁcit-debt counterfactual scatter plot where the debt is not adjusted,
show an inverse U-shape: up to 2009 we have an increase in debt corresponding to an
increase in deﬁcit while, after 2009, as the deﬁcit contracts (still remaining positive),
debt increases. The data, both when the debt is adjusted (red dots) and when is not
(green dots), follow the same pattern but the curves are shifted up and to the right. The
red dots in particular are outside the 90% conﬁdence intervals.
3.3 Unconditional forecast and trends
Figure 9 presents conditional and unconditional median forecasts against the realised
paths of the variables since 2008. This exercise is meant to assess two aspects of our
analysis. First, the unconditional forecasts, based on the pre-crisis estimated paramet-
ers, provide on the medium run a gauge on the pre-crisis trends that the model would
extrapolate from the data. Second, the diﬀerence between the conditional and uncondi-
tional forecast provides an indirect measure of the strength or weakness of the coupling
of each single variable with GDP and inﬂation.
It is worth observing that the diﬀerence between the realised paths for GDP and
HCPI and their unconditional forecasts can be thought of as the deviation by which the
conditional forecasts are informed. Conditional on the pre-crisis data, the model would
implicitly read them as due to a given sequence of shocks and use this information to
produce the conditional forecasts shown in Figure 6. By doing so the model should be
able to capture the cyclical dynamics of those variables that are correlated with GDP
and inﬂation (and that were not subject to structural change).
Figure 9 shows that several variables were co-moving with GDP and inﬂation in the
pre-crisis period  the gap between the conditional and the unconditional projections is
a measure of this. However, this is notably not the case for public, households', and
ﬁnancial corporations' debts. This can be read as an indication of the fact that due
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Figure 9: Conditional and unconditional forecast. The ﬁgure shows the realised data (red),
the median of the forecast conditioned on GDP and HICP paths (black) and the median of the
unconditional forecast (blue). House Prices and HICP are indices, interest rates and spreads are
expressed in yearly rates, HH Savings is the Eurostat saving ratio; all the other variables are in
Millions of Euros in real terms with 1995 as reference year.
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to two (pre-crisis) decades of leveraging, these variables have experienced movements
unrelated to GDP and in general to the economic cycle. This observation matches with
some of the stylised facts on ﬁnancial cycles reported in the literature (see, for example,
Borio, 2014).
Another feature that is in evidence in Figure 9 is the marked and very persistent
deviation of the path of many variables from the pre-crisis trends. The gap that opened
up during the crisis with respect to pre-crisis trends  among others for output, consump-
tion, investment, private and public debts, and house prices  does not seem to close
down in the ﬁnal part of the sample. This begs the question whether the observed devi-
ations are due to a very unusual and persistent cyclical event due to hysteresis eﬀects,
or they are better thought of as due to structural changes in the trend growth.
4 Conclusions and discussion
The analysis summarised in this section employs a large VAR incorporating a rich set
of macroeconomic, ﬁscal and ﬁnancial variables. Our model extracts information on the
multivariate dynamics of economic indicators from the 1981-2008 sample, and produces
forecasts (i) unconditional and (ii) conditional to the realised paths of output and prices.
While the ﬁrst can be thought of as a measure of the model-implied trends on the medium
horizon, the latter provide an indication of how the behaviour of the economy since 2008
deviated from historical business cycle regularities.
From our analysis a few facts emerge. First, most of the variables deviated strongly
and persistently from pre-crisis trends, among others output, consumption, investment,
private and public debts, and house prices. The deviations form pre-crisis trends do not
seem to close down in the ﬁnal part of the sample. Second, while for some of the variables
the deviation is explained by business cycle regularities and the deep contraction in
production, for others the deviation was anomalous even given the large drop in output.
This is notably the case for the protracted contraction in investment. Third, households'
and ﬁnancial corporations' debts seem to be weakly associated to the economic cycle in
the pre-crisis sample, possibly due to two decades of leveraging. Moreover, during the
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crisis, households' and ﬁnancial corporations' debts and house prices markedly deviated
from their pre-crisis trends. Finally, the jump in the ﬁscal deﬁcit-GDP ratio in 2008-2009
was unprecedented and so was the ﬁscal consolidation that followed. Importantly, this
anomaly in public deﬁcit is in large part explained by extraordinary measures in support
of the ﬁnancial sector, which show up in the stock-ﬂow adjustments and reveals a key
interaction between the ﬁscal and ﬁnancial sectors.
Our approach does not recover the nature of the shocks that caused the deep reces-
sion, nor allows to make causal statements. This limitations are largely common to the
literature that has studied ﬁnancial crises. However, our methodology provides a useful
descriptive account of the adjustment since the crisis, by distinguishing what can be
explained by its cyclical component and what are its speciﬁc characteristics as compared
to historical regularities.
The stylised facts recovered by our analysis point to the ﬁnancial stress and the as-
sociated sharp ﬁscal consolidation and as potential explanatory factors of the observed
anomalies. However, it is important to remark that, given our approach, we cannot
discriminate amongst potential competing explanations. In particular we cannot de-
termine whether the uncovered anomalous features were due to the `depth' of the drop
in output (and hence the activation of non-linearities and hysteresis eﬀects), to a sudden
permanent change in the underlying trends, or to the ﬁnancial nature of the crisis.
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B Public Interventions in Support of the Financial Sector
During the Crisis
We can distinguish between two types of public interventions for the ﬁnancial sectors:
those that aﬀect both debt and deﬁcit and those that aﬀect debt only. According to
the budget rules a capital injection can be considered as a capital transfer (increasing
the government deﬁcit, see the "residual" component in Figure 5) or as an acquisition
of equity (a ﬁnancial transaction, which does not impact on the government deﬁcit; we
have shown some ﬁgures relative to the period 2008-2011 in the Table 2 in the text).
Between 2008 and 2013 in the European Union there have been recapitalisation meas-
ures for 448.16 billions of euros accounting for 3.43% of GDP, and asset relief interven-
tions for 188.24 billions accounting for 1.44% of GDP. Overall these measures accounted
for 5.06% of GDP. This however is a small fraction of what was approved. We provide
a list of approved measures by categories below.
Guarantees on liabilities (bulk of the intervention):
• The EC authorised a total aid of EUR 3 892.6 billion (29.8% of EU GDP in 2013)
for guarantees on liabilities.
• The outstanding amount peaked in 2009 at EUR 835.8 billion (6.39% of EU 2013
GDP), and has decreased since.
• In 2013, outstanding guarantees amounted to EUR 352.3 billion (2.7% of EU 2013
GDP). However only EUR 3.13 billion of the total guarantees provided have been
called.
Recapitalisation
The EC authorised aid for EUR 821.1 billion (6.3% of EU 2013 GDP) in the last six
years. In 2008-2013, EUR 448 billion (3.4% of EU 2013 GDP) granted in recapitalisation
measures. This was mostly for the UK, Germany, Ireland and Spain.
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Direct Short Term Liquidity Support
The EC approved EUR 379.9 billion (2.9% of EU 2013 GDP) for liquidity measures.
However, Member States have practically used only a very small amount. Spain and the
Netherlands account for more than a half of the outstanding amounts in the peak year
2009.
Asset Relief Measures
In 2008-2013, Member States provided asset relief measures reaching EUR 188.2 billion
(1.4% of EU 2013 GDP) while the total aid approved was EUR 669.1 billion (5.1% of
EU 2013 GDP).
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